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Abstract 
I examine the implications of technological change for productivity, real wages and factor shares 
during the industrial revolution using recently available data.  This shows that real GDP per worker 
grew faster than real consumption earnings but labour’s share of national income changed little as 
real product wages grew at a similar rate to labour productivity in the medium term.  The period saw 
modest TFP growth which limited the growth both of real wages and of labour productivity.  
Economists looking for an historical example of rapid labour-saving technological progress having a 
seriously adverse impact on labour’s share must look elsewhere. 
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1. Introduction 
The term ‘Industrial revolution’ is often used to describe economic development in Britain between 
the 1760s and the 1830s.  It is well-known that real wages increased very slowly during this period of 
acceleration in technological progress which is often seen as an era when the share of wages in 
national income was under downward pressure in an early example of workers being replaced by 
machines.  Engels (1887) excoriated ‘the industrialists, who grow rich on the misery of the mass of 
wage earners’ and Allen (2009) coined the phrase ‘Engels’ Pause’ to describe the early decades of the 
19th century. 
This episode has attracted renewed interest from economists in the context of worries about the 
impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics on the labour market.  Informed by Allen’s account of 
Engels’ Pause, recent contributions by Frey (2019) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) both draw 
attention to what they see as a long wait for the innovations of the industrial revolution to benefit 
workers during which labour’s share of national income fell while highlighting the possibility that today 
a similar experience may be under way. 
If the industrial revolution is to be used as a template for thinking about the implications of AI, it is 
important to do so while using the best available estimates of real wage and productivity growth.  The 
publication of Broadberry et al. (2015) has improved the dataset in several respects compared with 
that which was available at the time of Allen (2009).  Annual estimates of real GDP and the GDP 
deflator and better estimates of labour productivity are now available with which Engels’ Pause can 
be re-visited.   
The heart of the matter is to compare the growth of real wages with that of labour productivity.  In 
this paper, this is implemented using these new estimates.  Real wages can now be measured either 
in terms of real consumption earnings or real product earnings.  The former will be appropriate for 
examining workers’ standards of living but the latter should be the basis for deriving trends in factor 
shares. 
The main results of this new analysis are as follows.  First, real wages grew more slowly than real GDP 
per worker during the industrial revolution.  However, the discrepancy was much less than has been 
claimed such that in 1820 the former had risen by about 12 per cent since 1770 and the latter by about 
16 per cent.  Second, labour productivity grew quite slowly prior to 1830 averaging a little below 0.4 
per cent per year in the 60 years after 1770.  Nevertheless, in the context of demographic pressure 
this was a very good outcome by pre-industrial standards.  Third, as relative prices changed and 
exportable manufactures became cheaper, over the long run real product wages grew somewhat 
faster than real consumption earnings.  Fourth, the share of profits in GDP rose over time from 17.2 
per cent in 1770 to 31.3 per cent in 1860 but this was associated with a decline in the share of land 
rents and the share of labour was little changed. Fifth, looked at through the lens of growth accounting 
the evidence is of total factor productivity (TFP) growth accelerating only gradually to 0.6-0.8 per cent 
per year during 1830 to 1860 with the steam age only materializing after 1830.   
In sum, this looks more like a story of paradoxically slow productivity growth than of pro-rich growth.  
The story of the industrial revolution is definitely not one of a new general-purpose technology 
boosting productivity growth at the expense of a big shift in the distribution of income which is the 
current fear about AI.   
2. Literature Review 
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Economists have recently been heavily engaged in looking for explanations of the declining share of 
labour in national income in recent decades in advanced economies.  These might see the industrial 
revolution as a precursor or, mutatis mutandis, they might seem to apply to the industrial revolution.  
Theoretical models have been developed in which technological progress can lead either to a phase 
in which real product wages fall before eventually increasing (Berg et al., 2018) or to an outcome in 
which real wages grow more slowly than labour productivity (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019).  In the 
latter case, the initial impact of a new technology like AI is to displace labour but over time growth 
creates new demands for labour as productivity goes up and capital deepening takes place and new 
tasks are created in which labour has a comparative advantage over machines although labour market 
adjustments may be slow.  There have also been empirical papers which attribute a substantial part 
of the recent decline in labour’s share to technological change through its implications for the 
automation of routine tasks and/or the substitution of cheaper capital for labour (Abdih and 
Danninger, 2017; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; IMF, 2017). 
Frey (2019) sees the experience of the British industrial revolution as a warning light in the context of 
developments in AI.  He describes a great divergence within Britain as wages stagnated, profits surged, 
and income inequality skyrocketed.  The gains of progress went overwhelmingly to the industrialists 
as the profits share of national income doubled in the first four decades of the 19th century while 
labour’s share decline.  Between 1780 and 1840 output per worker rose by 46 per cent but real wages 
by only 12 per cent.  His emphasis is on a prolonged period of pro-rich growth. 
This last estimate taken from Allen (2009) is, of course, the key to the fall in labour’s share which is 
the essence of Engels’ Pause.  The 12 per cent rise in real wages which is quoted is based on estimates 
of real consumption earnings made by Feinstein (1998).  These have gained quite wide acceptance, 
for example, they are the preferred series used by Thomas and Dimsdale (2017, table A48, column B).  
They were not, however, the estimate used by Allen who used Feinstein’s index of money wages but 
deflated them with his own cost of living index (Allen, 2007) which modified the story a bit and 
resulted in an 18 per cent gain between 1780 and 1840.  In fact, the evolution of real consumption 
wages in this period has been controversial for many years with a variety of different indices of money 
earnings and the cost of living being proposed.1  
Allen’s estimate that real GDP per worker rose by 46 per cent between 1780 and 1840 was derived 
using the growth estimates in Crafts and Harley (1992) and national accounts estimates by Feinstein 
(1978).  The correct figure is in fact 39 per cent if this method is used.2  Output per worker growth was 
significantly faster than the growth of real consumption earnings but not by as much as has been 
suggested by Frey (2019).  Improved estimates are now possible using the work of Broadberry et al. 
(2015).  This provides revisions to real GDP growth between the benchmark years in Crafts and Harley 
(1992) but also breaks new ground by providing annual estimates for both real and nominal GDP and 
the GDP deflator.  In fact, growth of real output per worker in the medium term is not very different 
from Crafts and Harley but the additional detail allows a new look at Engels’ Pause.3  In effect, 
 
1 Two recent estimates are by Clark (2010) and by Humphries and Weisdorf (2019).  They show considerably 
bigger increases in real consumption earnings between 1780 and 1840, at 46.5 and 35.0 per cent, respectively. 
2 Crafts and Harley’s estimates imply that output per worker grew at 0.38 per cent per year between 1780 and 
1830.  Feinstein gives an estimate of GDP in 1830 of £310 million at 1851-60 prices and then extrapolates this 
to 1860 using Deane (1968).  Based on Deane’s estimates, this gives an estimate for output growth between 
1830 and 1840 of 2.77 per cent per year and output per worker at 1.45 per cent per year.  In total then output 
per worker in 1840 would have been 39.0 per cent of the 1780 level. 
3 According to the new estimates, output per worker in 1840 was 38.4 per cent above the 1780 level (see Table 
2). 
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Broadberry et al. (2015) provided firmer evidence that the earlier estimates of labour productivity 
growth at 1.3 per cent per year during 1800-30 by Deane and Cole (1962) were much too high. 
3. Growth of Real GDP/Worker and Real Wages 
In this section, comparisons are made between the growth of real earnings and of labour productivity 
from a date which might be regarded as representing the onset of the industrial revolution to the 
middle of the 19th century.  1770 is the year after Arkwright’s water frame and James Watt’s steam 
engine were patented and is also the year that Feinstein’s real wage index (and Allen’s refinement of 
it) commences so it is an obvious starting point for this analysis. 
In Tables 1 and 2, the labour productivity growth estimates gathered from the Thomas and Dimsdale 
(2017) spreadsheet are those of Broadberry et al. (2015), the real consumption earnings are the series 
constructed by Allen (2007) while the real product wages is a new series constructed by deflating 
money wages from Feinstein (1998) by the GDP deflator from Broadberry et al. (2015).4  Others may 
prefer to use more optimistic estimates of real wages but the present exercise will establish whether 
Allen’s widely-cited findings still hold good when the earnings estimates are retained but placed in the 
context of Broadberry et al’s dataset.5 
The estimates reported in Table 1 show real consumption earnings growing more slowly than real GDP 
per worker from 1770 to 1800 and from 1800 to 1830 by about 0.13 and 0.16 percentage points per 
year, respectively.  It is interesting to note that the difference in 1800-1830 would have been about 1 
percentage point per year greater if Deane and Cole’s estimate of labour productivity growth was still 
accepted.  Between 1830 and 1860 real consumption earnings grew faster than real GDP per worker 
by 0.09 percentage points per year. 
The pattern of growth of real product wages was somewhat different.  Prior to 1800 it was below the 
growth of output per worker but subsequently the opposite was the case.  Real product wages grew 
faster than real consumption earnings throughout the first half of the 19th century.  Since the same 
index of money wage earnings is used for both series this is entirely the result of changes in relative 
prices which result in differences in the rate of change of the cost of living index and the GDP deflator. 
In Table 2, the evolution of these three series is compared in terms of their levels at 10-yearly intervals.  
Looking at the data in this way emphasizes that the big point about the early stages of the industrial 
revolution is how slowly both productivity and living standards rose rather than the discrepancy 
between their growth rates.  In 1820, after 50 years, real GDP per worker had risen by only 15.9 per 
cent compared with 11.6 per cent for real consumption earnings.  After 1820, real consumption 
earnings did not keep up with labour productivity but by 1850 the gap had narrowed and was once 
again quite small.  In 1830 and 1840 the increase in real GDP per worker since 1770 was 1.7 and 1.6 
times that of real consumption earnings, respectively rather than the 3.8 times that Frey headlined. 
For real product wages, the post-1820 story is rather different.  In 1830 they were almost level with 
real GDP per worker and by 1850 were ahead.  In that year, real product wages were 65.3 per cent 
above the level of 1780 whereas for real GDP per worker the figure was 54.3 per cent.  Given that 
 
4 Feinstein’s estimates (and therefore Allen’s) are for earnings rather than wage rates and therefore are 
suitable to compare with GDP for the purpose of deriving labour’s share of national income. 
5 There is no good reason to think that the wage data from either Clark (2010) or Humphries and Weisdorf 
(2019) are to be preferred. As might be expected, it is the case that using the alternative money wage series 
would give higher values for labour’s share as the first half of the 19th century unfolds.  Clark’s own calculations 
are reported in Table 4 and see Figure 3 in Humphries and Weisdorf for their calculation which shows labour’s 
share at 0.7 in mid-century. 
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Britain was an open economy and the price of exports such as cotton textiles was falling rapidly, a 
significant difference between movements in the GDP deflator and the cost of living, and therefore 
between real consumption earnings and real product wages, is not surprising.  With 1880 = 100, the 
net barter terms of trade declined from 196 in 1801 to 109 in 1840 (Imlah, 1958). 
Although an increase of only 11.6 per cent in real consumption earnings by 1820 may seem a very 
disappointing outcome, it needs to be put into context.  The rate of population growth increased from 
about 0.36 per cent per year between 1700 and 1770 to 1.13 per cent per year between 1770 and 
1820.  Estimated models of economic-demographic interactions find that the maximum population 
growth rate that the pre-industrial-revolution economy could sustain while maintaining constant real 
wages was a little under 0.5 per cent per year (Crafts and Mills, 2009; Lee and Anderson, 2002).  If, as 
Crafts and Mills estimated, the elasticity of wages with respect to population was about -0.7, then the 
additional 35 per cent population in 1820 on top of the number with maximum sustainable population 
growth would have been predicted to have reduced real wages by about 25 per cent in earlier times.  
Looked at in this way the small increase in real wages was really quite a good outcome. 
4. Factor Shares 
In this section, new estimates of the share of labour in national income during the industrial revolution 
are presented.  These are derived using the estimates of real product wages reported in Table 2.  It 
can be expected that they will look rather different from earlier estimates based on real consumption 
earnings.  There are also implications for capital’s share which is the residual share left over after 
accounting for wages and rents. 
Labour’s share of national income (LS) can be defined as wL /pY = (w/p)/(Y/L) where w is money wages, 
p is the GDP deflator, L is labour input and Y is real GDP.  Given an estimate of the share of labour in a 
base year, the share in other years can be calculated using the ratio of real product wages divided by 
base year real wages to GDP per worker divided by base year GDP per worker, i.e. 
LSt = LS0[(w/p)t/(w/p)0]/[(Y/L)t]/(Y/L)0]                                                                                                      (1) 
This formula should be implemented using real product wages not real consumption earnings.  This is 
now possible using the estimates of the GDP deflator in Broadberry et al. (2015) but these were, of 
course, not available to Allen (2009) who had to use real consumption earnings instead.  This was 
unfortunate because, as was outlined above, the evolution of these two series differs appreciably. 
I take 1800 as the baseline year and assign a value of 55.8 per cent for labour’s share.  This is the 
average of the years 1791-1800 in Allen’s (2009) dataset and is very close to the 56.6 per cent share 
which Allen (2019) obtained through analysis of Colquhoun’s social table for 1798.  Working forwards 
to 1860 as described generates an estimate of 60.2% for labour’s share which is close to the estimate 
given by Matthews et al. (1982) of 57.8 per cent for 1856.6 The new estimates for labour’s share are 
not very different from those made by Clark (2010) from the income side until the second quarter of 
the 19th century when in most years they are somewhat lower (Table 4).   
Tepper and Borowiecki’s (2015) review of various estimates of the share of land rent in national 
income endorses those made by Allen for his 2009 paper so I use them again here.  There is no direct 
way of estimating the share of capital every ten years and it is derived as national income minus the 
shares of land and labour.  The rate of profit is then inferred by dividing capital’s share by the capital 
 
6 The 1840 estimate of 59.2 per cent is also close to the estimate of 56.6 per cent for 1846 based on Smee’s 
social table reported by Allen (2019), see Table 4. 
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to output ratio.  The estimate of 16.9 per cent obtained for 1860 is close to the rate of 15.6 per cent 
in Matthews et al. (1982). 
The new estimates for labour’s share in Table 3 tell a different story from the one constructed by Allen 
(2009) which is reported in Table 4.  There is no decline in labour’s share in the first half of the 19th 
century but rather a modest increase from the levels of the late 18th century.  There is a substantial 
rise in the share of profits but not on the same scale as found by Allen (2009).  Arithmetically, over the 
long run, the increase in profits’ share is the counterpart of the decrease in the share of land rents in 
national income.  The rate of profit derived in Table 3 rises steadily over time but by rather less than 
the increase to over 20 per cent by the mid-19th century that Allen (2009) estimated. 
It may still be appropriate to use the phrase ‘Engels’ Pause’ to describe the trajectory of labour’s share 
but, according to these estimates, it is better applied to the late 18th century when it was both shorter 
and shallower than economists have been led to believe.  Allen’s (2009) estimates of a steady decline 
in the share of labour in national income from 55.8 per cent of national income in 1800 and to 44.4 
per cent in 1860 are at odds with all the other estimates in Tables 3 and 4. 
5. TFP Growth 
The Industrial Revolution was a time of famous inventions including those of Richard Arkwright, Henry 
Cort, Samuel Crompton, George Stephenson, and James Watt.  Watt invented the (improved) steam 
engine, thus inaugurating what is generally thought to be one of the most important general-purpose 
technologies ever.  Prima facie, this ‘wave of invention’ seems to suggest that TFP growth and labour 
productivity growth would both speed up dramatically.  It is perhaps natural then to suppose, as did 
Engels, that if real wages grew only slowly this means that the fruits of economic growth went to the 
rich. 
Growth accounting can provide a reality check on this proposition.  It is helpful to examine estimates 
using both the primal and dual methods.  The national income identity is 
Y = πK + wL + rN                                                                                                                                              (2) 
where K is capital, π is the rate of profit, L is labour, w is the wage rate, N is land and r is the land rental 
rate.  So, taking logarithms and differentiating with respect to time 
ΔY/Y = sK(Δπ/π + ΔK/K) + sL(Δw/w + ΔL/L) + sN(Δr/r + ΔN/N)                                                                  (3) 
where sK, sL, and sN are the factor shares of capital, labour and land, respectively.  Rearranging (3) gives 
ΔY/Y - sKΔK/K - sLΔL/L - sNΔN/N = sKΔπ/π + sLΔw/w + sNΔr/r                                                                   (4) 
The left hand side of (4) is the primal formula for TFP growth which is the rate of output growth minus 
the rate of growth of total factor inputs while the right hand side is the dual formula for TFP growth 
which is the sum of the factor-share-weighted factor rewards.  These formulae are implemented in 
Tables 5 and 6, respectively, using the data from which Table 3 was derived together with generally 
accepted estimates of capital stock, land input and real rents which are consistent with those data. 
The striking feature of the primal growth accounting estimates in Table 5 is that TFP growth was 
modest rather than spectacular, especially before 1830.  A similar picture is apparent from the dual 
growth accounting estimates in Table 6, although here the TFP growth rates are somewhat faster.  The 
data are evidently imperfect since there is a discrepancy between the two methods of estimating TFP 
growth rates but in either case the message is that famous inventions did not immediately promote a 
dramatic acceleration of TFP growth during the industrial revolution. 
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Three key points can be taken from Tables 5 and 6.  First, modest TFP growth was a major reason for 
underwhelming labour productivity growth before 1830.  Second, as the dual formula makes clear, 
TFP growth is what is available for increases in the returns to factors of production – if TFP growth is 
slow, real wage rates are unlikely to rise rapidly.  Third, especially given its large factor-share weight, 
slow real wage growth underpins the plausibility of an estimate of modest TFP growth. 
How can the paradox of famous inventions but modest TFP growth be resolved?  First, the impact of 
technological progress was very uneven.  Agriculture and most of the service sector other than 
transport was largely unaffected.  Sectors which we think of as the embodiment of the industrial 
revolution, namely, textiles, metals and machine-making accounted for less than a third of industrial 
employment – or 13.4 per cent of total employment - even in 1851 (Shaw-Taylor, 2009), while much 
industrial employment was still in ‘traditional’ sectors.  Second, the process of technological advance 
was characterized by many incremental improvements and learning to realize the potential of the 
original inventions.  This took time in an era where scientific and technological capabilities were still 
weak by later standards. 
Steam power offers an excellent example.  The estimates in Table 7 show that its impact on 
productivity growth before 1830 was trivial – as was made clear by the detailed quantitative research 
of von Tunzelmann (1978) and Kanefsky (1979).  In 1830, only about 165,000 horsepower were in use, 
the steam engine capital share was 0.4 per cent and the Domar weight for steam engines was 1.7 per 
cent (Crafts, 2004).  The cost effectiveness and diffusion of steam power was held back by the high 
coal consumption of the original low-pressure engines and the move to high pressure – which 
benefited not only factories but railways and steam ships - was not generally accomplished until the 
second half of the 19th century.  The science of the steam engine was not well understood and the 
price of steam power fell very slowly compared with that of computers in modern times, especially 
before about 1850.  The maximum impact of steam power on British productivity growth was delayed 
until the third quarter of the 19th century – nearly 100 years after James Watt’s patent.  This is a classic 
example of a general-purpose technology which had a large impact on productivity but only after a 
long lag (Crafts, 2004).  If Engels’ Pause was in the late 18th century, it certainly did not occur in the 
steam age. 
6. Discussion 
As we have seen, the industrial revolution is not a template for studying the impact of technological 
change that gives a rapid and substantial boost to productivity at the expense of a significant and 
prolonged decline in labour’s share of national income.  The experience of the industrial revolution is 
more one of productivity paradox than pro-rich growth.7  Nevertheless, it does mark a transition to 
modern economic growth based on sustained technological progress which is the hallmark of the post-
industrial revolution West. 
As Mokyr (2002) has emphasized, the key feature of the Industrial Revolution is that the process of 
innovation did not run into diminishing returns and fizzle out.  A growing use of (primitive) scientific 
methods investigated what works and developed and made accessible useful knowledge which could 
promote further technological advance.  Increased innovative capacity promoted micro inventions to 
capitalize on breakthroughs and led to the increase of TFP growth to an unprecedented 0.6 to 0.8 per 
 
7 Steam could be thought of as a precursor of Solow’s ICT productivity paradox except that you couldn’t see 
the steam age everywhere except in the productivity statistics in 1800. 
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cent per year after 1830.  The harbinger of this was a big increase in ‘less than top quality’ patents 
from the 1820s onwards (Nuvolari and Tartari, 2011).8 
The modest increase in labour’s share of national income reported in Table 3 does not mean that the 
displacement effects highlighted by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) were absent.  On the contrary, for 
some workers the impact of mechanization was devastating.  The most notorious example is that of 
the handloom weavers who initially gained a lot from the prior mechanization of spinning but were 
then swept away by the invention of the power loom.  They numbered 37,000 in 1780, 240,000 in 
1820 but only 43,000 in 1850 (Allen, 2018).  Their money wages were 75d per week in 1770, 276d in 
1805 (the peak year) but were back to 75d by 1830 (Wood, 1910).  In another well-known episode, 
the ’Captain Swing’ riots (1830-2), the evidence is that these were a response to the diffusion of 
threshing labour-saving threshing machines which wiped out winter earnings for many agricultural 
labourers (Caprettini and Voth, 2020). 
That said, the overall trajectory of the labour market saw a proliferation of new tasks and this was 
reflected in the expansion of lower-middle class occupations (Allen, 2019).  253,000 families (8.6 per 
cent) were in this group in 1798 but 649,000 (15.4 per cent) in 1846; workers comprised 61.1 per cent 
of families in 1798 and 61.4 per cent in 1846.   
7. Conclusions 
Looking at the industrial revolution with a view to finding a precedent for traumatic labour market 
shocks from labour-saving technological progress is misguided.  The key characteristic of the industrial 
revolution is a gradual acceleration of productivity advance which eventually completes a transition 
to modern economic growth.  This was not accompanied by a big decline in labour’s share of national 
income and was not the pro-rich growth that Engels imagined. 
Certainly, real consumption earnings growth was slower than the growth of labour productivity 
according to the comparisons made here but the difference is not as large as has been suggested.  By 
1840, real GDP per worker was 43.9 per cent above the 1770 level whereas real consumption earnings 
had risen by 27.1 per cent. 
After initially falling behind, the growth of real product wages was more similar to that of real GDP per 
worker such that by 1840 they were 39.8 per cent above the 1770 level.  This implied that there was 
no long-run tendency for labour’s share of national income to fall significantly.  The share of profits 
did increase markedly over time from 17.2 per cent in 1770 to 31.3 per cent in 1860 but this was 
accompanied by a matching decline in the share of land rents from 21.8 to 8.5 per cent of national 
income.  This was a redistribution between vieux riche and nouveau riche rather than between the 
poor and the rich. 
  
 
8 Nuvolari and Tartari (2011) assess the quality of patents on a quasi-citation basis.  They find that 50 per cent 
of the top 0.5 per cent of patents in the period 1702 to 1841 had been granted by 1794 but 50 per cent of all 
patents in this period came after 1823. 
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Table 1.  Rates of Growth of Real GDP/Worker and Real Earnings (% per year) 
 Real GDP/ 
Worker 
Real Consumption 
Earnings 
Real Product Wages 
1770-1800 0.43 0.30 0.14 
1800-1830 0.31 0.15 0.59 
1830-1860 0.92 1.01 0.99 
 
Note: real consumption earnings are money wage earnings deflated by a cost of living index whereas 
real product wages are money wage earnings (deflated by the GDP deflator. 
Sources: derived from Thomas and Dimsdale (2017), Table A8 Column B and A49 Column AI, Table 
A48 Column X, Table A47 Columns B and R. 
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Table 2.  Levels of Real GDP/Worker and Real Earnings (1770 = 100) 
 Real GDP/ 
Worker 
Real Consumption 
Earnings 
Real Product Wages 
1770 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1780 104.0 105.2   97.0 
1790 104.2 109.3   97.6 
1800 113.8 109.3 104.2 
1810 118.7 109.6 109.8 
1820 115.9 111.6 112.2 
1830 124.7 114.3 124.3 
1840 143.9 127.1 139.8 
1850 154.3 148.9 165.3 
1860 164.1 154.7 167.1 
 
Note: columns 2 and 3 are 5-year averages centred on year stated. 
Sources: as for Table 1. 
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Table 3.  Factor Shares (%GDP) and Implied Profit Rate (%) 
 Labour  Land Capital Profit Rate 
1770 61.0 21.8 17.2   9.8 
1780 56.8 21.4 21.8 12.6 
1790 57.1 19.8 23.1 13.1 
1800 55.8 18.3 25.9 15.3 
1810 56.4 16.3 27.3 16.0 
1820 59.0 15.8 25.2 14.3 
1830 60.7 15.1 24.2 14.1 
1840 59.2 12.5 28.3 15.9 
1850 65.3 10.5 24.2 12.9 
1860 60.2   8.5 31.3 16.9 
 
Note: profit rate obtained by dividing capital share by the capital-output ratio using capital stock 
estimates in Feinstein (1988, p. 454). 
Sources: land from Allen (2009) and own calculations, see text. 
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Table 4. Factor Shares: Previous Estimates (%GDP) 
 Labour Land Capital 
Allen (2019)    
1759 59.1 26.6 14.3 
1798 56.6 18.0 25.4 
1846 56.6 10.2 33.2 
1867 55.1 6.3 38.6 
Clark (2010)    
1760 58.4 19.5 22.1 
1770 58.4 20.2 21.5 
1780 60.3 18.6 21.1 
1790 59.0 18.4 22.6 
1800 57.7 17.7 24.6 
1810 58.6 16.5 25.0 
1820 60.9 14.0 25.1 
1830 62.4 11.6 26.0 
1840 64.5 10.8 24.7 
1850 65.1   9.2 25.7 
1860 65.1   7.7 27.2 
Matthews et al. (1982)    
1856 57.8 10.1 32.1 
Allen (2009)    
1770 56.5 21.7 21.8 
1780 55.3 21.4 23.3 
1790 56.2 19.8 24.0 
1800 55.8 18.3 25.9 
1810 54.1 16.3 29.6 
1820 48.3 15.8 35.9 
1830 49.9 15.1 35.0 
1840 49.0 12.5 38.5 
1850 47.4 10.5 42.1 
1860 44.4   8.5 47.1 
 
Note: Allen (2009) estimates are decadal averages. 
  
15 
 
Table 5.  Primal Growth Accounting Estimates (% per year) 
 Labour 
Contribution 
Capital 
Contribution 
Land 
Contribution 
TFP Growth Real GDP 
Growth 
1770-1800 0.6*0.9   0.2*1.2   0.2*0.5 0.32 1.2 
1800-1830 0.6*1.3 0.25*1.7 0.15*0.1 0.38 1.6 
1830-1860 0.6*1.3   0.3*2.9   0.1*0.1 0.64 2.3 
 
Note: weights approximate factor shares as in Table 3. Land input growth from (Allen, 2009); capital 
input growth from Feinstein (1988, p. 454); labour input and GDP growth from Thomas and 
Dimsdale (2017), as in Table 1. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table 6.  Dual Growth Accounting Estimates (% per Year) 
 Wage Rate 
Component 
Profit Rate 
Component 
Land Rental Rate 
Component 
TFP Growth 
1770-1800 0.6*0.14 0.2*1.50    0.2*-0.19 0.35 
1800-1830 0.6*0.59 0.25*-0.21 0.15*1.60 0.54 
1830-1860 0.6*0.99  0.3*0.62   0.1*0.50 0.83 
 
Note: factor shares as in Table 5. Real product wage rate from Table 1; profit rate from Table 3; land 
rental rate is nominal rental rate from Clark (2002) deflated by GDP deflator. 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table 7.  Steam Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth (% per year) 
 Steam Capital 
Deepening 
Steam TFP 
Growth 
Total 
1760-1800   0.004   0.005 0.01 
1800-1830 0.02   0.001 0.02 
1830-1850 0.16 0.04 0.20 
1850-1870 0.20 0.21 0.41 
1870-1910 0.15 0.16 0.31 
 
Note: these estimates are derived using a standard growth accounting formula: 
Δln(𝑌/𝐿) = 𝛼𝐾𝑂Δln (
𝐾𝑂
𝐿
) + 𝛼𝐾𝐼𝐶𝑇Δln (
𝐾𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝐿
) + 𝜇Δ𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑂 +  𝜙Δ𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 
 
where KSteam is steam-capital inputs, ASteam is TFP in production of steam power, KO is other capital 
input and AO is other TFP; Φ and μ are Domar weights for the steam and other sectors, respectively. 
Source: Crafts (2004). 
 
